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EXPANDING NLRA PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEE
ORGANIZATIONAL BLOGS: NON-DISCRIMINATORY ACCESS
AND THE FORUM-BASED DISLOYALTY EXCEPTION
ANDREW F. HETTINGA*
INTRODUCTION
Since 1935, Congress has protected the rights of American workers to
communicate with each other as they seek to better the conditions of their
collective employment.' Over the seventy-six years of its existence, the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") has protected employees who
solicit coworkers to join a union, reach out to other employees in order to
mobilize them about poor working conditions or unfair wages, seek public
support for workplace plights, and more.2 Historically, employees used
traditional methods of communication to achieve these goals: leaflets and
handbills distributed to employees or posted on bulletin boards, 3 letters to
local newspapers or comments on local television reports, 4 or "water
cooler" conversations in break or lunch rooms. 5 However, as employees
use more powerful electronic methods of communication that exceed the
scope of traditional fora to organize themselves, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board6 and federal courts must consider anew what limitations may
be placed on employee communication rights.
Today, employee organizational speech increasingly occurs via inter-
active web sites known as "web logs."' 7 Though the exact definition of a
blog varies, a fair approximation is as follows:
* Juris doctor candidate, May 2008. The author would like to thank his wife Kristen for her
love, encouragement, and patience during the writing of this article, his parents, Paul and Joanna, and
his brother, Joseph, for their unwavering support over the past two years, and Professor Martin H.
Malin for his insightful comments and assistance with this article.
1. See National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158(a)(1) (2000).
2. See Nancy J. King, Labor Law for Managers of Non-Union Employees in Traditional and
Cyber Workplaces, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 827, 835 (2003) (advising non-union employers on what discipli-
nary actions can be taken regarding organizational speech).
3. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
6. Hereinafter "the NLRB" or "the Board."
7. Hereinafter referred to as "blogs." Many commentators have noted the increased use of blogs
for employee organizational speech. See Katherine M. Scott, iBrief, When Is Employee Blogging Pro-
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A blog (short for weblog) is a personal online journal that is fre-
quently updated and intended for general public consumption. Blogs are
defined by their format: a series of entries posted to a single page in re-
verse-chronological order. Blogs generally represent the personality of
the author or reflect the purpose of the [w]eb site that hosts the blog.
Topics sometimes include brief philosophical musings, commentary on
[i]ntemet and other social issues, and links to other sites the author fa-
vors, especially those that support a point being made on a post.
8
The differences between blogs and more traditional forms of em-
ployee organizational speech are crucial. America's labor unions have rec-
ognized that blogs are a powerful means of discussing workplace issues
and organization; as one commentator recently noted, the Service Employ-
ees International Union "has blogging technology available free of charge
to each of its local unions."9 Generally, the blog's key advantages to em-
ployees seeking to engage in organizational speech are as follows:
Wider scope: Blogs potentially have a much wider audience than tra-
ditional communication forms; they can reach employees at other physical
locations, the clients and customers of their employers, stockholders, local
and national media, and by extension the national public-and can there-
fore greatly swing leverage to the employees' side in workplace disputes.1o
Ability to facilitate dialogue: Blogs are not static-they allow inter-
ested parties to post their own responses at will, and often facilitate ongo-
ing dialogue on a particular topic. In this way, they resemble traditional
"water cooler" conversations. But blogs greatly expand the scale of these
conversations, so that many voices can be included simultaneously: the
format allows employees separated geographically or by work schedules to
participate, as well as employees in the same industry working for different
employers. "1
tected by Section 7 of the NLRA?, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 17, 1-2,
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2006dltr017.html; King, supra note 2, at 828-29; see
also LEE RAINIE, DIRECTOR, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE STATE OF BLOGGING (2005),
available at www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP-blogging-data.pdf (citing survey stating that blog reader-
ship rose 58% in 2004, that approximately 12% of Internet users have used blogs to post comments, and
that approximately eight million American adults maintain blogs).
8. Whatis.com, http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,289893,sid9_gci214616,00.html (last
visited Feb. 18, 2007).
9. Carson Strege-Flora, Wait! Don 't Fire That Blogger! What Limits Does Labor Law Impose on
Employer Regulation of Employee Blogs?, 2 SHIDLER J. L. COMM. & TECH. 11, 3 (2005),
http://www.lct joumal.washington.edu/Vol2/a01 I Strege.html.
10. See Scott, supra note 7, 1 ("Blogging has tremendous potential to shift the balance of power
from employers to employees, as employees gain the ability to communicate their concerns to other
employees, customers, neighbors, stockholders, and other parties interested in the employer.").
11. Id. ("While employers can already send messages to employees through their own communi-
cation channels, employees now have a new means of discussing issues with each other, regardless of




Protection of anonymity: Traditional labor law protects an employee's
right to receive organizational literature anonymously, and safeguards em-
ployees from retributive action by their employers for doing so. 12 The blog
format provides an attractive means of accomplishing this goal, as visitors
to most blogs can post comments anonymously. 13
Increased credibility: As commentator Katherine Scott notes, blogs al-
low links to information and materials supporting employee complaints or
workplace disputes to be easily provided-thereby allowing "[a]nyone
reading the blog [to] see the factual support for or interest in any idea that
is posted."' 14 This can greatly increase the credibility of employee organiza-
tional speech, especially to observers outside the workplace dispute.
However, the same factors that make the blog such an effective tool
for employee organizing often cause employers great concern: increased
notoriety (especially the tendency of employee blogs to turn up in search
engine queries regarding the related employer's company name) increases
the chances for damaging defamation, disparagement of company products,
or breaches of confidentiality,15 and the anonymous nature of the blog can
thwart the identification of insubordinate workers. A very limited number
of cases testing what actions employers may take against employees who
blog about their workplaces have come before the NLRB to date, but evi-
dence suggests more cases relating to employee blogging are on the way. 16
Because of the hybrid, unique nature of this new forum and its potential to
greatly assist employees seeking to organize themselves to fight for work-
place rights, the NLRB and courts should carefully consider what protec-
tions federal labor law provides for employee blogs. Other commentators
have recognized that blogging should probably be protected by the
12. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 884 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that employer
surveillance "tends to create fear among employees of future reprisal" and chills the exercise of NLRA-
protected communication rights); Snap-On Tools, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 5, 5 n.5 (2004) ("The well-
established rule is that absent proper justification, photographing or videotaping employees as they
engage in protected concerted activity violates [the NLRA].").
13. See Scott, supra note 7, 2 ("[T]he anonymity of the [i]ntemet allows employees to explore
information about a labor dispute and test the waters without having to reveal their identities.").
14. Id.
15. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
16. Google and Delta, for example, received national attention recently for firing employees that
maintained blogs discussing their personal experiences in the workplace. See Krysten Crawford, Have a
Blog, Lose Your Job?, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 15, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/02/14/news/
economy/blogging/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2007) (discussing Mark Jen, a former Google employee fired
for maintaining a website discussing work life, and Ellen Simonetti, a former Delta flight attendant also
fired for maintaining a blog discussing workplace experiences); see also Stephanie Armour, Warning:
Your Clever Little Blog Can Get You Fired, USATODAY.COM, June 14, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2005-06-14-worker-blogs-usat-x.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2007);
Strege-Flora, supra note 9, 4.
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NLRA17; this note seeks first to echo these commentators' opinions that
employee blogs should be extended the same federal protections offered to
employee organizational speech occurring in more traditional fora. This
note's primary purpose, however, is to suggest an analytical framework for
determining the extent to which employee organizational speech should be
protected under the NLRA, particularly with regard to such speech occur-
ring outside the workplace. In this proposed framework, the amount of
protection depends first on how the employee is accessing and/or posting to
the blog, and second on the type of forum in which the blog appears-a
public forum, an employee-sponsored forum, or an employer-sponsored
forum.
In Part I, this note will discuss the NLRA's general background and
what employee speech is traditionally protected under the Act, including
discussion of the critical NLRA terms "concerted" and "for mutual aid and
protection." Part II identifies the first of two distinct categories of protected
employee organizational speech that has emerged in labor law jurispru-
dence-organizational speech occurring inside the workplace-specifically
discussing what limits employers may lawfully place on this category of
organizational speech both historically and in the evolving electronic
workplace. Part II concludes by asserting that traditional labor law doctrine
regarding organizational speech inside the workplace should be applied to
the employee blogger's workplace access to the forum. Part III discusses
the second category of protected employee organizational speech-speech
occurring outside the workplace-and identifies three sub-categories of
outside the workplace fora: the public forum, the employee-sponsored fo-
rum, and the. employer-sponsored forum. Part III also discusses the judi-
cially created "disloyalty exception" doctrine, and describes how it has
traditionally been used to remove organizational speech from NLRA pro-
tections in the subcategories above. Part IV suggests a new analytical
framework for applying the disloyalty exception to blogs that hinges on
which subcategory of organizational speech those blogs fall into.
I. BACKGROUND
Section 7 of the NLRA gives "[e]mployees... the right. .. to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of... mutual aid and protec-
17. See Scott, supra note 7, 4 (noting that NLRA protections "likely extend to employee blogs
under certain circumstances"); Matthew E. Swaya & Stacey R. Eisenstein, Emerging Technology in the
Workplace, 21 LAB. LAW. 1, 3-4 (2005) (noting that while the NLRB has yet to rule on the specific
issue, nonunion and union employers "should exercise caution prior to disciplining an employee based
on a blog posting that criticizes the terms and conditions of her employment").
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tion." 18 In addition to employee rights to engage in union organizational
activities, section 7 has been interpreted to protect non-union employees'
concerted efforts to better the conditions of their employment.19 Disciplin-
ing employees for engaging in organizational speech is considered an un-
fair labor practice, as adjudicated initially by the NLRB and then by federal
courts; to be insulated from adverse action by employers, however, organ-
izational speech must first be "concerted" and "for mutual aid and protec-
tion." 20
A. Defining "Concerted" Under the NLRA
The NLRB and courts have arrived at a rather broad definition of
"concerted" speech, which includes the following: organizational speech
directed at only one other employee2 l; speech that failed to actually pro-
duce any concerted group activity but appears to have had such activity as a
primary goa 22; speech from employees who are merely spokespersons on
matters of common concern 23; speech amounting to merely an implicit
attempt to induce concerted action on the part of other employees 24; speech
that is a "logical outgrowth" of previous group activity 25; and even com-
pletely independent expressive activity, not preceded by any group discus-
18. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
19. See, e.g., NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 1948) ("A proper
construction [of the NLRA's section 7] is that the employees shall have the right to engage in concerted
activities for their mutual aid or protection even though no union activity be involved .....
20. See King, supra note 2, at 832.
21. Mushroom Transp. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3rd Cir. 1964) (noting the axio-
matic labor law premise that conversations between two employees are protected provided that it ap-
pears, at the very least, that the conversation "was engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing or
preparing for group action or that it had some relation to group action in the interest of the employees");
see Reef Indus., Inc., 300 N.L.R.B. 956, 959 (1990) (holding that the activities of only two employees
in protesting employer comments were "concerted").
22. See Mushroom Transp. Co., 330 F.2d at 685 (holding that preliminary discussions between
workers that concern a proper subject of organized action need not be disqualified for section 7 protec-
tion because they do not actually result in organized action or even in "positive steps toward presenting
demands"). The court went on to recognize that section 7's goals would be thwarted if communications
between employees were not protected because of lack of fruition. Id.
23. See id. at 684; King, supra note 2, at 834.
24. Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 247 (1997) (noting that the object of inducing
group action need not even be express in order for the speech to be protected under section 7). In Time-
keeping Systems, the NLRB held that despite a specific call for organizational action in an employee's
organizational email, the speech was "concerted" because it forwarded an opinion regarding an em-
ployment policy with the intent of generally arousing support for that position. Id. at 248.
25. Every Woman's Place, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 413, 413 (1986) (holding that an employee's inde-
pendent action was concerted because she and coworkers had already met and discussed related work-
place issues and brought concerns to the employer).
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sion and not characterized as a protest, as long as the activity implies a
common goal to alter workplace conditions.
26
Though neither the NLRB nor the courts have considered whether
blogs might be concerted speech, employee websites with the overt goals
of encouraging concerted employee action, encouraging dialogue regarding
employment issues, or that generally speak for other similarly situated em-
ployees have been protected by section 7,27 as have other analogous elec-
tronic media forms. 28  As these examples suggest-and as other
commentators have noted29-it seems highly likely that an employee blog
could be "concerted" for the NLRA's purposes. Though a blog, by its na-
ture, cannot be directed at one specific person, once an employee creates a
blog concerning a workplace topic the correspondence might be determined
an "implicit" attempt to organize, even before another employee posts to
the blog, and therefore protected.
30
B. Defining "Mutual Aid and Protection" Under the NLRA
Defining what employee organizational speech acts "for mutual aid
and protection" has proved a more difficult task for the NLRB and the
courts. 31 Beginning with the landmark case of Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, the
U.S. Supreme Court clearly extended section 7's reach outside the realm of
union activity and collective bargaining to include general employee action
to improve working conditions or terms, provided that the speech was con-
nected to a tangible workplace issue. After Eastex, the Board and courts
took a relatively wide view of when employee speech relates closely
enough to a workplace issue so as to be "for mutual aid and protection"
under section 732: speech relating to wages, hours, physical environment,
26. NLRB v. Mike Yurosek & Son, Inc., 53 F.3d 261, 263-65 (9th Cir. 1995) (involving four
individuals who individually refused to work overtime without previously discussing their actions with
each other or characterizing their refusal as protest; nonetheless, their activities were "concerted"
because they implied a common goal).
27. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 882 n.10 (9th Cir. 2002). The court used
a section 7-style analysis to consider the question of whether Hawaiian had interfered with Konop's
protected right to organize, recognizing that "[w]hile employers covered under the RLA are not subject
to the provisions of the NLRA, courts look to the NLRA and the cases interpreting it for guidance." Id.
Proceeding under this analytical framework, the court began by flatly stating that "[tihere is no dispute
that Konop's website publication would ordinarily constitute protected union organizing activity." Id. at
882.
28. See Timekeeping Systems, 323 N.L.R.B. at 246-47 (determining that a company-wide email
discussing work vacation policy was concerted speech under section 7).
29. See Swaya & Eisenstein, supra note 17, at 4; Scott, supra note 7, 18.
30. See supra note 22.
31. See Scott, supra note 7, 8.
32. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 83 (John E. Higgins, Jr. ed., 5th ed. 2006) (discussing
examples in concluding the definition of "for mutual aid and protection" is broad).
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dress codes, and working assignments or responsibilities is generally pro-
tected. 33 Some additional subjects of employee organizational speech re-
lated closely enough to working conditions to warrant NLRA protection are
alerting management to a malicious rumor, 34 posting a sign and alerting
news media that a mysterious illness was afflicting workers,35 refusing to
contribute to the denial of another employee's section 7 rights, 36 discussing
work schedules, 37 distributing materials urging coworkers to vote in favor
of laws affecting employment, 38 criticizing and urging opposition to the
employer's implementation of new employment policies, 39 and complain-
ing to the employer's clients about working conditions. 40 The NLRB and
courts have even gone so far as to uphold, under very narrow circum-
stances, organizational speech calling for the removal of a direct supervisor
or company executive.41 For the purposes of this note, it suffices to note
33. See, e.g., Vemco, Inc. v. NLRB, 79 F.3d 526, 530 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that protected
speech must relate to a labor dispute, and because the definition of labor dispute is broad, employee
interests must "bear a reasonably significant impact upon working conditions or some material incident
of the employment relationship"); see also Scott, supra note 7, 8.
34. See, e.g., Gatliff Coal Co., 301 N.L.R.B. 793, 798 (1991) (involving two employees who
consulted management regarding a rumor they feared could impact employment; the actions in consult-
ing management were protected).
35. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp., 293 N.L.R.B. 719, 724 (1989) (involving employees who
agreed to embark on a public campaign to disclose recent outbreaks of a mysterious illness, carried
through by posting notice inviting other employees to talk about the illness on television; the actions
were held to be protected activity).
36. See, e.g., Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 294 N.L.R.B. 47, 82, 85 (1989) (holding that a supervi-
sor's refusal to write poor performance evaluations for an employee was protected where the employer
sought to fire that employee for protected organizational activity).
37. See, e.g., K Mart Corp., 297 N.L.R.B. 80, 83 (1989) (noting that "[i]mproved working condi-
tions," including working schedules, are a frequent objective of protected organizational activity, and
that discussions about the condition at issue are therefore necessary to further that objective; holding
that employee "discussion about such a subject [work schedules] can be protected activity and that an
employer's unqualified rule barring such discussions has the tendency to inhibit such activity").
38. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 569 (1978) (holding as protected speech em-
ployee distribution of literature criticizing state legislation regarding "right to work" and presidential
veto of minimum wage laws). But see NLRB v. Motorola, Inc., 991 F.2d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 1993)
(stating that "Eastex noted that at some point, employees' interest in distributing literature that deals
with matters affecting them as employees ... may be so removed from the central concerns of [the
NLRA]" as to remove protections; denying employees the right to distribute literature protesting drug
testing laws (internal quotations omitted)). Other commentators have examined this interesting question
and its application to employee blogs at greater length. See generally Scott, supra note 7, 16-17.
39. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
40. Compuware Corp. v. NLRB, 134 F.3d 1285, 1291 (6th Cir. 1998) (protecting employees who
complained directly to customers regarding working conditions, noting that "[e]mployees have the right
to engage in concerted communications with third parties regarding legitimate employee concerns, such
as terms and conditions of employment and grievances").
41. NLRB v. Oakes Mach. Corp., 897 F.2d 84, 86-89 (2nd Cir. 1990). The Second Circuit upheld
the NLRB's finding that three employees were protected when they wrote a letter complaining about
the activities of their company's president. Id. at 86. The court stated that while "action seeking to
influence the identity of management hierarchy is normally unprotected activity" because it is not a
legitimate employee interest, "[i]n a narrow category of cases, however, concerted activity to protest the
2007]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
that employee organizational speech relating to political issues affecting the
workplace could be protected under certain circumstances. 42 What is im-
portant to note about all the subjects that have been protected by the NLRB
and courts, however, is that employees discussing these subjects will only
be protected if their speech relates to an actual, ongoing workplace dis-
pute.
43
Though the Board has not yet considered whether a blog's contents
might be "for mutual aid and protection," it is fair to assume, as numerous
other commentators have, 44 that the content of some employee blogs can
meet these relatively broad requirements. The wide array of subject matter
held to be protected under the NLRA could easily be, and in fact currently
is, the central topic of an employee's blog. 45 The blog forum's expansive
nature-posts can be fairly long and can cover a wide array of subjects-
raises questions about how much blog content must relate to actual work-
place disputes for the entire blog to be protected; the "relatedness" of
speech content to workplace disputes is discussed at length below when
considering how courts apply the "disloyalty exception" doctrine. 46 It suf-
fices here to simply note that there are likely situations where blogs will at
least meet the threshold determination of being "for mutual aid and protec-
tion."47
Even where employee organizational speech meets the threshold re-
quirements of "concerted" and "mutual aid," labor law still balances the
employee's section 7 rights against the competing property interests of
employers-both to prevent actual and virtual "trespassing" by non-
employees to the workplace, 4 8 and to preserve the proper function of the
employer's business. For the purposes of this note, it will be helpful to
discharge of a supervisor or to effect the discharge or replacement of a supervisor may be pro-
tected . I... Id. at 89 (citations omitted).
42. See Eastex, Inc., 437 U.S. at 569-70, 575 (holding that the distribution of a letter urging
support for a political campaign was protected under the NLRA, because the political issue was related
to specific workplace issues). But see Motorola, Inc., 991 F.2d at 280, 285 (rejecting protection of
employee distribution of outside political literature).
43. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 29.
45. There are numerous examples to be found online of anonymous employee blogs that relate
(albeit in some cases sporadically) to workplace issues cited above as possibly falling under NLRA
protection. See, e.g., Anonymous Work Blogs Blogring, http://anonworkblogs.blogspot.com/ (last
visited May 22, 2007); Retail Record, http://retailrecord.blogspot.com/ (last visited May 22, 2007).
46. See infra pp. 22-25.
47. Katherine Scott also discusses an interesting problem that might further complicate whether an
employee's blog will be protected: when a poster to a blog thread generally discussing protected work-
place topics goes beyond the scope, should the entire blog be protected? Scott, supra note 7, 17.
48. Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in Cyberspace:
Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L: REV. 1, 40 (2000).
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classify employer interests in "regulating" employee section 7 speech into
two distinct categories and discuss in turn the limitations placed on em-
ployee organizational speech rights in both categories. Proceeding under
the assumption that certain employee blogs meet the NLRA's threshold
requirements for section 7 protection, Part II below will discuss traditional
labor law rules for what controls employers can place on otherwise pro-
tected employee organizational speech within the workplace, how those
rules have been adapted by the use of email for organizational speech, and
argue that this traditional framework should be extended to blogging. Part
III will discuss limitations on NLRA protection outside the workplace.
II. ORGANIZATIONAL SPEECH WITHIN THE WORKPLACE
When addressing what controls employers may place on organiza-
tional speech within the workplace, the NLRB and the courts have often
considered two questions: First, when must employers allow outside indi-
viduals to distribute information to employees for organizational purposes?
Second, what controls or policies can employers lawfully put in place to
curtail inter-employee organizational speech in the workplace? The first
question regarding access for non-employees for organizational purposes
(usually union organizers) is largely not relevant to this note's purposes
because of the functional manner in which blogs work-employees typi-
cally seek blogs out of their own volition.49 I pause only to note that the
Supreme Court has clearly held that an employer may not be compelled to
allow non-employees access to its physical property for the purposes of
distribution or solicitation unless there is no reasonable alternate means for
reaching those employees.50 As an example of such "unreachable" employ-
ees, courts have posited the extreme examples of isolated mining or log-
ging camps.51
49. The access issue would be relevant where a non-employee organizational blogger emails
employees a link to their blog. For a more complete discussion of this potentially effective organiza-
tional tactic, see id. at 39-40.
50. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956). In discussing what restric-
tions employers can place on distribution, the Court said,
[A]n employer may validly post his property against nonemployee distribution of union litera-
ture if reasonable efforts by the union through other available channels of communication will
enable it to reach the employees with its message and if the employer's notice or order does
not discriminate against the union by allowing other distribution. In these circumstances the
employer may not be compelled to allow distribution even under such reasonable regulations
as the orders in these cases permit.
Id.
5 1. The Babcock Court recognized that in situations where employees are isolated from civiliza-
tion, and solicitation outside the workplace is thereby prohibitively difficult, access for solicitation
might be required. Id. at 11. The Court also recognized this possibility in Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 799 (1945), noting that the situation before it was not "like a mining or lumber
2007]
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Considering the second question-what controls can employers place
on inter-employee organizational speech in the workplace-in the context
of electronic communication has important implications for when and how
employees may access and post to blogs while physically in their work-
places. Labor law has come to recognize the rights of employees to engage
in the two core organizational speech activities-to "solicit" and "distrib-
ute"-using traditional modes of communication (leaflets, handbills, or in
person solicitations) in the workplace. 52 In traditional labor cases, "distri-
bution" typically means handing out leaflets or flyers around the work-
place-a "one-way" dissemination of literature 53-while "solicitation"
typically involves inter-employee conversations or dialogue.
54
In 1945, the Supreme Court established that employees can solicit
other employees to organize while on employer property and in work ar-
eas, provided it is during non-work times and the employer cannot show
some special circumstance-for example, loss of production or effi-
ciency-that might prevent it.
55
The Board and courts quickly distinguished between solicitation and
distribution for the purposes of setting employer rules, however. 56 The
rights of employees to distribute written organizational speech are also
protected, but only on non-working time and in non-working areas.5 7 The
Board explained this distinction by reasoning that though organizational
conversations in the workplace must be allowed to take place in work areas
to be effective, the same is not true for the distribution of literature:
It does not follow.., that an identical adjustment is appropriate
where distribution of literature is involved. The distinguishing character-
istic of literature as contrasted with oral solicitation-and a distinction
too often overlooked-is that its message is of a permanent nature and
that it is designed to be retained by the recipient for reading or re-reading
camp where the employees pass their rest as well as their work time on the employer's premises, so that
union organization must proceed upon the employer's premises or be seriously handicapped."
52. See King, supra note 2, at 859-61.
53. Id. at 860-61.
54. Id. at 860.
55. See Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. at 803 n.10 (recognizing and adopting the Board's
ruling below: "It is therefore not within the province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule
prohibiting union solicitation by an employee outside of working hours, although on company prop-
erty.").
56. King, supra note 2, at 860-61 (citing Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 616 (1962)
("[W]e believe ... that a real distinction exists in law and in fact between oral solicitation on the one
hand and distribution of literature on the other. Further, we believe that logic and precedent call for
recognition of this distinction and its legal effects.")).
57. See Stoddard-Quirk, 138 N.L.R.B. at 617.
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at his convenience. Hence, the purpose is satisfied so long as it is re-
ceived. 58
Therefore, since employee organizational objectives are achieved just as
easily by handing out literature in non-working areas like the parking lot or
lunchroom, there was no need to infringe on the employer's property rights
by allowing distribution of literature in work areas where it might disturb
production. 59
Since Republic Aviation was decided in 1945, it has been considered
"black letter" labor law that companies cannot put blanket policies in place
preventing solicitation (for example, inter-employee organizational conver-
sations) during the entire time an employee is at work (because that ban
presumptively includes employee break and lunch times). 60 Likewise,
however, it is also "black letter" labor law that employees cannot "distrib-
ute" (for example, hand out leaflets regarding employment issues) in any
work areas or during any work time.61 The distinction between distribution
and solicitation, then, has traditionally been an important one in labor law:
the right to distribute is more limited than solicitation, because effective
distribution requires only that the target receives the message, while effec-
tive solicitation requires face-to-face interaction.
The traditional battleground for testing the limits of employees' rights
to distribute organizational literature in the workplace has been the com-
pany bulletin board; unions and employees have often fought for the "dis-
tribution right" to post organizational messages to such boards located in
common workplace areas.62 The general rule is that employers may not
discriminate against allowing employee access to bulletin boards-once
they allow employee access for non-work purposes, they cannot discrimi-
nate against organizational speech.63
As email message systems in the workplace emerged and workers
used the new technology for organizational messages, the NLRB and courts
58. Id. at 620.
59. See id.
60. See, e.g., Timken Co., 331 N.L.R.B. 744, 752 (2000) ("[E]mployees have the right... to
distribute union literature and to solicit for the union on non-work time and in non-work areas.").
61. See supra note 56.
62. See generally Malin & Perritt, supra note 48, at 44-45.
63. See, e.g., Timken Co., 331 N.L.R.B. at 754 ("Employees have no statutory right to use an
employer's bulletin board but, if permission is granted, it must not be accorded selectively and dispar-
ately to prevent union literature postings whereas other nonbusiness postings are permitted."). But see
Guardian Indus. Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317, 321-22 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that when an employer
grants employee access to bulletin boards for personal notices such as "for sale" signs, it strains the
Board's "no discrimination" rule to say that the employer must then allow organizational speech in that
forum: "Distinguishing between for-sale notices and announcements of all meetings, of all organiza-
tions, does not discriminate against the employees' right of self-organization.").
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relied on traditional principles regarding inside-the-workplace organiza-
tional communication to decide what protections applied. 64 However, the
Board has not decided whether employee organizational speech sent via
email is distribution or solicitation. 65 As numerous commentators have
noted, email may be a "hybrid" between the two: as a one-way communica-
tion from sender to recipient, it resembles the distribution of literature;
when emails encourage and generate immediate dialogue, they more
closely resemble solicitations. 66
The Board has considered whether an employee e-mail disputing a
company policy was protected speech and, applying reasoning analogous to
that used in distribution cases, apparently concluded that since the em-
ployer allowed personal use of the email system, it could not discriminate
against organizational speech. 67 In the relevant case, the employer pro-
posed a new vacation day policy and invited employees to voice their opin-
ions. 68 In response, software engineer Lawrence Leinweber sent an email
to all company employees concluding that the new policy in fact was less
favorable to them than the old.69 The email contained "flippant and rather
grating" language and was generally disparaging in tone70; Lienweber was
eventually dismissed for "failure to treat others with courtesy and re-
spect."'71 However, the NLRB affirmed the administrative law judge's or-
der to reinstate Leinweber. 72 The Board likened Leinweber's message more
to distribution cases where employees left pamphlets on co-worker's desks
to be discovered the next morning during working hours-since it "could
64. See Adtranz, 331 N.L.R.B. 291, 293 (2000). When faced with the use of e-mail for organiza-
tional purposes and an employer's attempt to limit that communication, the Board reasoned,
It is well established that there is no statutory right of an employee or a union to use an
employer's bulletin board.... However, that right may not be exercised discriminatorily so as
to restrict postings of union materials.
Similarly, there is no statutory right of an employee or a union to use an employer's tele-
phone for personal or nonbusiness purposes. However, once an employer grants the privilege
of occasional personal use of the telephone during worktime, it may not lawfully exclude un-
ion activities as a subject of discussion.
Analogously, Respondent could bar its computers and E-mail system to any personal use
by employees. In this case, Respondent did permit E-mails of a personal nature, notwithstand-
ing its rule. Therefore, Respondent could not exclude the union as a topic of discussion.
Id. (citations omitted).
65. King, supra note 2, at 866-67.
66. Elena N. Broder, Note, (Net)workers' Rights: The NLRA and Employee Electronic Communi-
cations, 105 YALE L.J. 1639, 1661-62 (1996); see Malin & Perritt, supra note 48, at 52-53.
67. See Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 248-49 (1997).
68. Id. at 245-46.
69. Id. at 246.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 247.
72. Id. at 250.
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not have taken Respondent's employees more than a few minutes to di-
gest," it could not have amounted to substantial disruption. 73 Furthermore,
the Board noted that the company permitted employees to spend some
working time in non-work pursuits, including posting "simple" emails to
each other.74 Therefore, the Board seemed to hold that, as in other more
traditional cases of employer control over bulletin boards, once the em-
ployer allows personal messages or communication to be posted it cannot
discriminate against organizational speech. 75
Washington Adventist Hospital, Inc., however, provides an example of
the limitations placed on employee use of the employer's communications
system.76 In that case, employee Driver sent a system-wide email via his
work computer system to every employee with a computer terminal at
Washington Adventist Hospital protesting recent layoffs at the facility. 77
The message temporarily shut down any terminal receiving it, causing seri-
ous delays in patient care and general consternation of the hospital's work-
force. 78 The administrative law judge concluded the message was not for
mutual aid and protection and therefore "[Driver's] sudden, unauthorized
taking over the computer-communication system, regardless of how 'con-
certed,' benign, or worthy the motive might have been.., was not pro-
tected" because it interfered with the work of hospital employees operating
terminals in the computer system. 79 Importantly, the employer had a policy
preventing personal use of the message system and apparently enforced
it80; moreover, Driver sent his missive via a "break message," which shut
down all terminals receiving it-not merely as a "normal" message, which
he could have done much less invasively. 81 While Washington Hospital
seems to establish an employer defense if organizational speech transmis-
sions overly burden the employer's electronic infrastructure, it is also im-
portant to note that the Timekeeping Systems court refused to apply
Washington Hospital's holding to deny protection for Leinweber's message
because he did not "take over" the entire email system. 82
73. Id. at 249.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. See 291 N.L.R.B. 95, 103 (1988).
77. Id. at 98.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 103.
80. See id. at 99-100 (describing how the employer discovered employees using terminal-to-
terminal messages for dating purposes and "warned them not to do it again").
81. See id. at 98 (discussing the difference between mere terminal-to-terminal messages and the
break message Driver sent).
82. Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 249 (1997).
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Timekeeping Systems' "no organizational discrimination" doctrine for
employee email use has mostly been followed by the Board and courts in
the wake of the ruling. 83 In this line of cases, the Board has analogized
email use policies to traditional reasoning regarding employee access to
company bulletin boards, telephones, or other property for non-business
reasons. 84 Though the Board seemingly admits that under certain circum-
stances such blanket policies might be legitimate under the NLRA, 85 the
NLRB's General Counsel has also issued memorandums opining that busi-
ness-only policies covering email and internet use among employees are
facially in violation of the NLRA because they might prohibit employees
from engaging in protected solicitation-type activities.
86
The NLRB's doctrines limiting employer control over the means of
organizational communication in the workplace are relevant to the blogging
context when considering what controls employers may place on an em-
ployee's use of a workplace internet connection to access organizational
blogs. Because of the close analogies between email systems and blogs,
employer controls over employee blog access while in the workplace
should be limited in the same way those controls have been limited in the
context of employer "business only" email policies in the workplace. 87 It
seems logical to apply the Timekeeping Systems "no discrimination" rule to
employee blogs, which would mean that a company's internet policy could
not be applied in a discriminatory manner to prevent an employee from
accessing an organizational blog with her company-provided internet con-
nection. 8 8
In traditional labor law, employee solicitation has been allowed in
working areas during non-working time. If emails can be considered a hy-
brid that has at least some of the characteristics of both distribution and
solicitation, a blog is surely also such a hybrid; in fact, the blog probably
83. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 897 (1993) (holding that an
employer policy that prohibited employee access to e-mail for union purposes while allowing employee
e-mail use for other non-work purposes violated the NLRA); King, supra note 2, at 862.
84. See supra note 64.
85. See King, supra note 2, at 862.
86. See, e.g., Pratt & Whitney, Case 12-CA-18446, NLRB General Counsel's Advice Memoran-
dum (Feb. 23, 1998), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/research/memos/advice-memos/ index.aspx
("We conclude that the [e]mployer's prohibition of all non-business use of electronic mail ... including
employees' messages otherwise protected by Section 7, is overbroad and facially unlawful.").
87. For obvious reasons, if employees are using an entirely personal means (for example, emailing
or accessing from home) for organizational blogging, there is no level of employer involvement in
controlling the blogging transmissions themselves.
88. See Scott, supra note 7, 32 ("[Eixisting doctrines that control employer restrictions on
employee communications are thus easily adaptable to the analysis of blogging policies."); Broder,
supra note 66, at 1662-64 (arguing that rules governing distribution in the workplace would apply to
organizational email, especially when workers "telecommute").
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has more characteristics of solicitation than an email message. Applying
Timekeeping Systems' rule, an employee emailing from his desk (work
area) on his lunch break (non-work time) should be allowed to send mes-
sages containing protected organizational speech, despite even a blanket
"business only" policy. The analogy between email and internet usage poli-
cies at America's workplaces is obvious; the two policies are often lumped
together in employee handbooks, 89 and are likely to implicate the same
employer concerns over time wasting and inappropriate use. In the end, it is
logical to apply the exceptions and doctrines surrounding the "business
only" policies to internet usage. The most likely employer argument against
such an extension-that it would force employers to tolerate many non-
protected uses of this medium (i.e., using internet access to download inap-
propriately large files or otherwise hurt computer storage capacity, or view
inappropriate materials)90-is easily defeated by realizing that such uses
will not be considered concerted or for mutual aid and protection and there-
fore are not protected organizational activity.
Furthermore, in examining the Board's jurisprudence in situations
with more traditional distribution methods and applying that framework to
what one commentator has called the "electronic workplace," it appears
that under certain unique circumstances employers should be compelled to
allow employees to use internet or email connections for organizational
speech regardless of any "business-only" policies they may have-
especially in unique cases where employees are physically isolated from
one another across the country, are professionally "tech savvy," and com-
municate with one another regarding workplace issues primarily via email
or other electronic communications. 91
Traditional labor law rules regarding organizational speech inside the
workplace and what controls employers may place on it have implications
for how an employee should be able to access organizational blogs at work.
However, the blog format is in most cases accessible to the public. Because
of this public element, blogs are likely not only a hybrid of solicitation and
distribution-like email-but also a hybrid of inside and outside the work-
place speech. Therefore, Part III must examine organizational speech oc-
89. See, e.g., Texas Utilities Co., Case 16-CA-20121-2, NLRB General Counsel's Advice Memo-
randum (Jan. 28, 2000), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/research/memos/advicememos/ index.aspx
(considering employer policy which stated that "[iintemet... and [el-mail are provided by the Com-
pany for business-related use. Any personal use by [u]sers must be kept to a minimum, must comply
with all [c]ompany policies").
90. See King, supra note 2, at 848-49.
91. See Scott, supra note 7, [ 35 ("Obviously, when employees are spread across many locations,
or when they spend little or no time at employer facilities, the Internet may be the only practicable way
for them to communicate.").
2007]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
curring outside the workplace and what controls employers may place on it.
In examining decisions considering this type of speech, Part III first identi-
fies three distinct categories of fora in which this speech generally occurs
and the important differences in approach the Board and courts have tradi-
tionally applied to these categories. Next, Part III discusses a broad-
reaching exemption to section 7-the judicially created disloyalty excep-
tion doctrine that removes organizational speech outside the workplace
from NLRA protection-and how this exception has been applied.
III. ORGANIZATIONAL SPEECH OUTSIDE THE WORKPLACE
When discussing the level of protection afforded to employee organ-
izational speech occurring outside the workplace and meeting the threshold
requirements of "concerted" and "for mutual aid and protection," it is use-
ful to recognize three distinct categories of fora in which this speech has
traditionally occurred-and into which employee blogs might also easily be
placed. The first category, the "public forum," involves employee organiza-
tional speech occurring in public media or generally directed at people
outside the company workforce or management; the most important feature
of the public forum is that its contents are accessible by the employer's
clients and customers. 92 The second category, the "employee-sponsored
forum," involves employee organizational speech occurring in media cre-
ated, hosted, or otherwise controlled by the employee. 93 The third category,
the "employer-sponsored forum," has been generally alluded to above 94-it
is a forum for employee speech hosted by the employer, but that has been
generally opened to employees (at least partially) for their personal use.
9 5
These categories become critically important when analyzing the
mechanism by which the Board and courts remove otherwise protected
employee speech from NLRA protection: the "disloyalty exception," which
exempts organizational speech that is excessively disloyal to the employer.
As will be discussed below, the disloyalty exception has been, at best, un-
evenly applied by the courts to all three categories of organizational fora
identified above.
96
92. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
96. See Melinda J. Branscomb, Labor, Loyalty, and the Corporate Campaign, 73 B.U. L. REV.
291, 295 (1993) ("The disloyalty exception has never been clearly defined, uniformly understood, or
consistently applied.... [The NLRB] and courts have struggled laboriously but unsuccessfully to make




A. The Public Forum
Traditionally, "public-forum" organizational speech has occurred in
letters to a newspaper's editorial section or comments for reported news
stories9 7; employee-produced handbills, letters, or leaflets mailed or other-
wise distributed to people outside the company itself (usually to employer
clients or local businesses) 9 8; and even the websites of local newspapers. 99
The key distinguishing factors of the "public forum" are that it is accessible
by members of the general public (or at least selected people outside the
ranks of employees and employers) and that its publication is in no way
sponsored, paid for, or controlled by the employer or the employee. Many
employee blogs might currently be placed into this category, as they are
hosted via private internet providers. 100
B. The Employee-Sponsored Forum
The second category closely resembles the traditional union newslet-
ter-it is a publication entirely financed and published by union members
on their time, with their (or the union's) resources, and directed entirely at a
non-employer audience. 10 1 An employee blog falling within this category
was most recently discussed in Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., where an
employee created and maintained a website hosted at his own expense and
accessible for viewing and posting only by fellow employees via a pass-
word. 102
97. See Endicott Interconnect Tech., Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 532, 537-38 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (hold-
ing that while employees' published comments to a newspaper reporter regarding the effects of com-
pany layoffs were otherwise "concerted" and "for mutual aid and protection" for section 7 purposes,
they fell under the disloyalty exception and were therefore not protected); Community Hosp. of Roa-
noke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 607, 610 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding hospital's adverse employment
actions taken in response to an employee's comments on a local television news program discussing
bad working conditions at the employer's hospital violated the NLRA, because the employee's speech
was concerted and for mutual aid and protection).
98. See NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers (Jefferson Standard), 346
U.S. 464, 472 (1953) (involving employees who distributed flyers critical of their employer to clients).
This case is commonly referred to as the Jefferson Standard case, which will be discussed in greater
detail below.
99. See Endicott, 453 F.3d at 534 (involving an employee who posted comments regarding em-
ployer on local newspaper's website, on which the paper had designated a public forum for discussions
regarding layoffs at the employee's workplace).
100. See infra note 45.
101. See Phoenix Transit Sys., 337 N.L.R.B. 510, 512-13 (2002) (involving employee organiza-
tional speech published in a union newsletter distributed to 500 other employees; the court noted that
"the sort of communication which takes place when articles are published in union newsletters has long
been found to be protected, concerted activity").
102. See 302 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002). In Konop, the plaintiff was a pilot for Hawaiian, and
created and maintained a website where he posted material critical of the airline and the incumbent
union. Id. He controlled access to his website by requiring visitors to the site to create user names and
2007]
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
C. The Employer-Sponsored Forum
The traditional employer-sponsored forum for employee organiza-
tional speech was discussed in Part II above: the company bulletin
board. 103 Email might also be classified as an employer-sponsored forum
for organizational speech, as discussed above.' 04 Many large companies
have also created their own blogs, included on their websites, which they
open to employees for their use in discussing workplace issues; however,
research has shown that these blogs are sometimes open to the public.'
05
For this note's purposes, this forum's defining characteristics are that it is
controlled, owned, and maintained by the employer as a platform for dis-
cussion of workplace issues; the employee has access to the forum for per-
sonal purposes; and clients or the general public may or may not have
access. This new forum presents an interesting hybrid between inside and
outside the workplace speech: if no outside parties have access to the fo-
rum, such blogs might easily be analogized to the oft-argued-over company
bulletin board-as internal company-wide email messages have been. 1
06
D. The "Disloyalty Exception"
An important exception to the general rule that employers may not
discipline employees for engaging in protected organizational speech under
section 7 is generally referred to as the "disloyalty exception."' 107 This ex-
ception doctrine allows employers to punish otherwise protected employee
organizational speech because it is openly disloyal; the NLRB created this
exception in response to the Supreme Court's landmark 1953 Jefferson
Standard ruling. 10 8 In Jefferson Standard, the employer owned local radio
and television stations in Charlotte, North Carolina. 109 After negotiations
between the employer and its technicians broke down, the technicians did
not strike but picketed during non-working times-they still received full
passwords, and by only allowing a selected list of people (mostly Hawaiian Airlines employees) to log
on. Id.
103. See supra note 62-65 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
105. See Swaya & Eisenstein, supra note 17, at 3 n.7 (noting that Microsoft and General Motors
have created such blogs).
106. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Endicott Interconnect Tech., Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 532, 537 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
108. See, e.g., id. ("Following Jefferson Standard, the Board has formulated its own two-part test
under which an employee's communication to a third party is deemed protected under section 7 if, first,
it is related to an ongoing labor dispute and, second, it is 'not so disloyal, reckless or maliciously untrue
as to lose the Act's protection."').
109. NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers (Jefferson Standard), 346
U.S. 464, 466 (1953).
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pay.1 10 At some point, though, the technicians printed 5,000 handbills and
distributed them to local businesses and mailed them to local businessmen.
The handbills read,
Have you seen one of [Jefferson Broadcasting's] programs lately? Did
you know that all the programs presented over WBTV are on film and
may be from one day to five years old. There are no local programs pre-
sented by [Jefferson Broadcasting]. You cannot receive the local baseball
games, football games or other local events because WBTV does not
have the proper equipment to make these pickups. 111
The technicians who authored these handbills were discharged. 112 The
board declared the firings an unfair labor practice, but the Supreme Court
reversed and held that, despite the fact that they might have been engaging
in otherwise concerted speech, the handbills were "so disloyal" as to lose
NLRA protection.1 13 In finding the employees' disloyalty rose to such a
level as to remove protection, the following factors were important to the
Court: that the communication disparaged company product, directed that
disparagement towards clients (advertisers here), and made no reference
either to any legitimate labor dispute, wages, hours, or working conditions,
and therefore had no discernable relation to the labor controversy at is-
sue. 11
4
In the wake of Jefferson Standard, the NLRB and federal courts of
appeal developed the so-called "disloyalty exception" doctrine. It is impor-
tant to note that though the Board and courts have sometimes conflated the
two inquiries, whether speech is "concerted" and "for mutual aid and pro-
tection" and whether the disloyalty exception doctrine applies to remove
NLRA protections are in fact two separate and distinct analyses.1 15 Though
courts have been inconsistent in their application of the doctrine, commen-
tators have generally identified three types of "disloyal speech": confiden-
tiality breaches, 116 recklessly or maliciously false statements, 117 and
110. Id. at 467.
Ill. Id. at 468.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 472.
114. Id. at 471-77.
115. See Branscomb, supra note 96, at 311-12. Branscomb notes that in practice, the Board and
courts have not rigorously observed distinctions between section 7 threshold analyses and disloyalty
exception applications:
They have often collapsed what should be distinct inquiries into one. The Board and Courts
occasionally skip [considering whether speech is concerted and for mutual aid and protection]
and proceed directly to analyze whether the employee lost protection under an exception,
such as disloyalty. This approach may result in a failure to determine if the activity is con-
certed or has a section 7 purpose.
Id. (footnote omitted).
116. This note will not discuss organizational speech amounting to a breach of confidentiality.
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remarks disparaging the employer or its products.'1 18 The first two catego-
ries are relatively easy to categorize as disloyal regardless of the forum in
which the organizational speech appears. However, what kind of organiza-
tional speech falls in the final category--"disparaging speech"-remains
nebulous: based on the body of case law decided in the years since Jeffer-
son Standard, it is difficult to ascertain what, exactly, amounts to the type
of disloyalty that will subject employees' otherwise protected organiza-
tional speech to discipline. 119
1. Applying the Disloyalty Exception to Public-Forum Organizational
Speech
The D.C. Circuit recently applied the disloyalty exception to remove
from NLRA protection employee organizational speech made in the public
forum. 120 In Endicott Interconnect Technologies, Inc. v. NLRB, employee
Rick White provided comments to a local newspaper for a story regarding
announced layoffs at his company. 121 He stated in part that the layoffs left
"gaping holes in this business," and that they had left voids in the critical
knowledge base for the highly technical manufacturing business in which
EIT was engaged. 122 In response to the article, IBM (which purchased
products from the EIT plant, accounting for sixty percent of sales) con-
tacted EIT and expressed concern that the company had "gutted" critical
positions and regarding the ongoing quality of EIT products. 123 While ad-
vocating for union organization at the plant, White also posted a message
on a website the newspaper maintained as a public forum that asserted the
employer's "business is being tanked by a group of people that have no
good ability to manage it" and that.management staff "will put it into the
117. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 882 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting employer's
tenable argument that Konop lost protection for this organizational speech "because his articles con-
tained malicious, defamatory and insulting material known to be false"); Scott, supra note 7, 9. This
note will not discuss this type of organizational speech.
118. Katherine Scott and other commentators have generally identified these distinct categories of
"disloyal" speech. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 7, 9.
119. See Branscomb, supra note 96, at 309. Branscomb notes,
The first problem encountered by those seeking to make sense of the disloyalty exception is
not a substantive one concerning the merits of disloyalty, but rather the absence of an analyti-
cal framework within which to evaluate section 7 cases generally. The lack ofa framework is
especially conspicuous and troublesome in cases concerning disloyalty and disparagement,
and its absence has led to confusing decisions with questionable results.
Id. (emphasis added).
120. See Endicott Interconnect Tech., Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 532, 537 (D.C. Cir. 2006).





dirt." 124 The court concluded that his initial statements to the newspaper
removed White's comments from section 7 protections on disloyalty
grounds; because of their "critical nature and injurious effect" the com-
ments amounted to a "sharp, public, disparaging attack upon the quality of
the company's product" at a "critical time" as identified in Jefferson Stan-
dard.125
However, other courts have allowed employee organizational speech
in the public forum that is critical or disparaging of employer products to
remain protected by section 7, as exemplified in the Community Hospital of
Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB decision. 126 In Community Hospital, a nurse
provided an on-air interview for a local television program where she dis-
cussed problematic working conditions at her employer's hospital, saying
"there are times ... when there are not [nurses] to cover the whole medi-
cal-surgical unit of 40 patients." 127 The hospital argued that the employee's
statements fell under the disloyalty exception because she had "disparaged
and discredited the quality of nursing care available at the hospital, to the
point of insinuating that it was unsafe." 128 However, the court held that
because the employee's statements were "directly related to protected con-
certed activities then in progress" at the hospital-an ongoing labor dispute
over working hours-they were protected. 129
The organizational speech in Sierra Publishing Co. v. NLRB may also
be classified as within the public-forum category because it was directed at
and accessible by the employer's customers. 130 In that case, a letter from
union organizers was sent directly to the newspaper employer's advertisers
protesting employment practices, but also generally disparaging manage-
ment decisions and the future quality of the newspaper.131 The court never-
124. Id. at 535.
125. Id. at 537.
126. See 538 F.2d 607, 610 (4th Cir. 1976).
127. Id. at 609.
128. Id. at 610.
129. Id. Other courts have since followed this approach. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mount Desert Island
Hosp., 695 F.2d 634, 641 (1st Cir. 1982). In Mount Desert, an employee nurse with concerns about
hospital working conditions and "inept managerial policies" sent a letter to a local newspaper detailing
these complaints and alleging lowered staffing levels caused "quality patient care [to] go down the
drain." Id. at 636 & n.I. The court of appeals held that the hospital's subsequent decision not to rehire
the employee was an unfair labor practice:
Grange's comments, like those [in the Community Hospital case], were made for the purpose
of improving working conditions and thus the level of patient care. The AU found that criti-
cism of the Hospital's administration was intertwined inextricably with complaints of work-
ing conditions. Even if the staffing situation were worse in Roanoke, Grange published his
letter in a spirit of loyal opposition-not out of malice or anger.
Id. at 641.




theless concluded that the speech retained its protection, because the letter
was related to the labor dispute at issue, 132 and the letter's "tone was both
constructive and hopeful" and did not impugn the paper's journalistic in-
tegrity. 133 Importantly, the court concluded that employee organizational
speech directed at third parties--even clients or customers-can easily be
taken with a grain of salt (and the possible bad impacts for the employer
thereby lessened) if the third party clearly knows of the context in which
the disparaging or critical comments appear.
134
2. Applying the Disloyalty Exception to the Employee-Sponsored Forum
In the recent Konop case, the Ninth Circuit applied the disloyalty ex-
ception doctrine to an employee-sponsored forum: a website designated
exclusively for employees and that was password protected. 135 Many of the
employee's criticisms related to his opposition to labor concessions that
Hawaiian sought from the union; his website encouraged Hawaiian em-
ployees to seek alternative union representation. 136 Konop's website pro-
claimed that Hawaiian vice presidents did "dirty work ... like the Nazis
during World War II" and that a particular vice president was "one incom-
petent at the top," had "little skill and little ability with people," and was
suspected of fraud. 137 James Davis, a vice president at Hawaiian, used the
usernames and passwords of two employees (with their permission) to log
onto the website and view its contents. 138 Konop alleged, among other
things, that he was placed on medical suspension in retaliation for his
comments on the website in violation of the Railway Labor Act. 139
The court used a section 7-style analysis to consider the question of
whether Hawaiian had interfered with Konop's protected right to organize,
recognizing that "[w]hile employers covered under the RLA are not subject
to the provisions of the NLRA, courts look to the NLRA and the cases
132. Id. at 217.
133. Id.; see also Allied Aviation Serv. Co. of New Jersey, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 229, 231 (1980),
enforced, 636 F.2d 1210 (3rd Cir. 1980) (holding an aircraft mechanic's letter to the employer's cus-
tomers, commercial airlines, informing them of lax safety practice was protected; in rejecting the dis-
loyalty exception, the Board noted that "great care must be taken to distinguish between disparagement
and the airing of what may be highly sensitive issues").
134. Sierra Publ'g Co., 889 F.2d at 217 ("Moreover, extending § 7 protection in this direction does
not pose an unreasonable threat to employers; third parties who receive appeals for support in a labor
dispute will filter the information critically so long as they are aware it is generated out of that con-
text.").
135. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 882 (9th Cir. 2002).
136. Id. at 872.
137. Id. at 882-83 (alteration in original).




interpreting it for guidance."' 140 Proceeding under this analytical frame-
work, the court began by flatly stating that "[t]here is no dispute that Ko-
nop's website publication would ordinarily constitute protected union
organizing activity."' 14 1 However, Hawaiian argued that Konop's organiza-
tional speech lost its statutory protection under the disloyalty exception
because his articles contained "malicious, defamatory and insulting mate-
rial known to be false,"' 142 an argument the court assumed to proceed along
disloyalty exception lines. 143 The court disagreed, finding that Konop's
statements were simply "rhetorical hyperbole" and opinions protected by
federal labor laws. 144 Importantly, the court reversed the lower court's
grant of summary judgment against Konop on his charges that Davis inter-
fered with his organizing activities under the RLA by viewing the website
under false pretenses.145 The court noted that "[a]bsent a legitimate justifi-
cation, employers are generally prohibited from engaging in surveillance of
union organizing activities." 146 The Ninth Circuit had previously found
unfair labor practices where an employer had "eavesdropp[ed] on private
conversations between employees and [a] Union representative" that oc-
curred in an employee break room; the Konop court expressly stated that it
saw "no principled distinction between the employer's eavesdrop-
ping ... and Hawaiian's access of Konop's secure website. '' 147 The court
remanded for a determination of whether Hawaiian's "eavesdropping" in
this case was justified by its concerns over identifying and correcting any
false statements. 148
3. Applying the Disloyalty Exception to the Employer-Sponsored Forum
When considering the application of disloyalty exception doctrine to
an employer-sponsored forum, it is especially important to first recognize
that if the public has no access to the forum the disloyalty exception likely
has no application at all. 149 In the Washington Hospital case, the employee
organizational speech at issue was essentially a company-wide email mes-
sage not at all accessible by the public. 150 The administrative law judge
140. Id. at 882 n.10.
141. Id. at 882.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 883 n.l 1.
144. Id. at 883.




149. See Washington Adventist Hosp., 291 N.L.R.B. 95, 101 (1988).
150. See id.
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decided this case without reaching any possible application of the disloy-
alty exception doctrine, but stated in dicta that the doctrine probably did not
apply because no outside people had seen the message:
I think it sufficient to note that the message, not addressed to or seen by
nonhospital personnel, did not openly insult the administration or dispar-
age the hospital or its services .... [A]s noted, the message was not ad-
dressed to third persons or seen by third persons, much less the general
public and did not hold up the hospital, its personnel, or its services to
ridicule or disparagement. In short, were it necessary to decide the issue,
I would conclude that the message itself was not so insulting or disparag-
ing to the hospital or to the administration or to the hospital's officers as
to come within the Jefferson Standard rule and render conduct which
was otherwise concerted and protected outside the pale of statutory pro-
tection. 151
The Timekeeping Systems case, discussed above, also shows a court's
refusal to apply the disloyalty exception doctrine to organizational speech
in an employer-sponsored forum where the outside world had no access to
that speech-again, in the form of a company-wide email.152 In declining
to apply the doctrine, the court noted that it is the public disparagement of
company products that the Jefferson Standard Court found so critical in
declaring organizational speech disloyal, and quickly concluded that since
"[n]o such public disloyalty occurred here" the disloyalty exception did not
apply. 153
In the wake of decisions applying the disloyalty exception, finding a
workable standard for when employee organizational speech of the so-
called "disparaging product" variety rises to the level of disloyalty seems
difficult at best. 154 Since employee blogs may be categorized as "outside
the workplace" speech, they will be subject to the disloyalty exception. It is
also clear that meaningful distinctions may be drawn between different
types of employee speech in general and blogs specifically. Part IV sug-
gests a framework for applying the disloyalty exception to blogs based on
151. Id.
152. See Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 249 (1997). After finding organizational
speech protected, the court considered the application of the disloyalty exception doctrine but declined
to apply it.
153. Id.
154. See Branscomb, supra note 96, at 309. Compare Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d
868, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the disloyalty exception doctrine but nevertheless protecting the
employee's speech comparing employer personnel to "the Nazis during World War 1I" and calling a
company president "one incompetent at the top" with "little skill and little ability with people"), with
Endicott Interconnect Tech., Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 532, 537 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (applying the disloyalty
exception doctrine and declining to protect organizational speech that included statements that "there
were gaping holes in [the employer's] business" and that there were "voids in the critical knowledge
base for the highly technical business").
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these distinctions. This framework will help the Board and courts give this
important new communication forum the protection it properly deserves.
IV. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR APPLYING THE DISLOYALTY EXCEPTION TO
ORGANIZATIONAL SPEECH OUTSIDE THE WORKPLACE
Before suggesting a new framework for applying the disloyalty excep-
tion doctrine to employee blogs, we must first idehtify the following factors
the Board and courts have traditionally relied on to apply the exception and
remove speech from NLRA protection: how closely connected employee
comments are to actual labor disputes155; the timing of the organizational
comments (i.e., the more "critical" a time for the employer with regards to
their relationship with the marketplace, the more likely the speech will be
deemed disloyal)156; the general tone (overly harsh, critical, attacking,
etc.)157; the employee's general motive 58; and the intended audience (the
employer's clients or customers, the general public, or other employees). 159
While many of these factors are subjectively applied by the Board and
courts, it appears that determining when organizational speech's "general
tone" rises to the level of disloyalty may be most susceptible to this prob-
lematic flaw. 160
155. See NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers (Jefferson Standard), 346
U.S. 464, 476 (1953); Emarco, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 832, 833 (1987) (finding that employees' remarks to
general contractor that employer subcontractor never paid its bills, was "no damn good," and could not
finish the job was not disparaging because they were "related to" the labor dispute and were not so
disloyal, reckless, or maliciously untrue as to lose protection).
156. See Endicott, 453 F.3d at 537.
157. See id.
158. See Richboro Cmty. Mental Health Council, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 1267, 1268 (1979) (holding
that an employee's letter protesting employer's discharge of another employee and accusing employer
of mismanagement was protected in part because the letter's tone was not malicious and the employee's
motive was not impure). The Board stated,
[The employee's] appeal is clearly distinguishable from the type of public disparagement of
an employer's product which the Board has found unprotected. In those cases, the disparage-
ment was calculated to alienate the public's patronage as a tactic to increase the employees'
leverage in the labor dispute. [The employee's] comments cannot be construed as a deliberate
attempt to injure Respondent by impugning its operation. Rather, the clear purpose of his let-
ter was to remedy Respondent's discharge of [another employee]. There is nothing in the let-
ter to suggest that [the employee's] intent was to sabotage or undermine Respondent's
reputation.
Id. (footnotes omitted). 4
159. See id. at 1267-68 (noting that the employee's , i'?' las directed at state funding agencies
whose decisions were critically important to the employer).'
160. The Timekeeping Systems Board provided a useful recap of the difficult practice of evaluating
"general tone" to discover sufficiently egregious disloyalty to an employer. See 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 249
(1997) (refusing to apply the disloyalty exception). Noting that the question of what, exactly, will place
organizational speech that would otherwise be protected into "disloyalty exception" territory is not
easily answered, the Board stated that "[s]ome concerted conduct can be expressed in so intolerable a
manner as to lose the protection of Section 7," and that, generally, employee speech will not be pro-
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Given the employee blog's unique advantages for organizational
speech discussed above-a wider scope, better ability to facilitate dialogue,
closer protection of employee anonymity, and increased credibility 161-and
given that they therefore present clear tactical and practical advantages to
employees seeking to organize over their traditional communication coun-
terparts, the disloyalty exception doctrine should be judiciously applied to
blogs.
As discussed above, it seems obvious that as a threshold matter em-
ployee organizational blogs can be, under certain circumstances, found to
fall within section 7's requirements of "concerted" and "for mutual aid and
protection."' 162 Given the arguably inconsistent manner in which the NLRB
and courts have applied disloyalty exception doctrine to organizational
speech outside the workplace, 163 it might therefore be advantageous for a
different analytical approach to be used for the exception's application to
the important new format of employee organizational blogs--one which
limits the use of subjective factors like the speech's general "tone" to de-
clare disloyalty. Neither the NLRB nor the courts approach the application
of the disloyalty exception doctrine by explicitly considering first what
forum the employee organizational speech appears in-an inquiry that
inherently includes many of the considerations listed above, such as the
intended audience and the employee's general motive, and potentially trun-
cates analysis by rendering other factors partially moot (e.g., if no custom-
ers can access the forum, then the timing of employee comments, direct
relation to labor disputes, or even general tone will be much less impor-
tant). 164
As discussed above in Part III, this analytical framework should al-
ways begin-as one commentator suggests-with the threshold determina-
tion that organizational blogs are "concerted" and "for mutual aid and
protection."' 165 Should employee blogs meet the threshold requirements,
tected when it occurs in a manner "so violent or of such serious character as to render the employee
unfit for further service." Id. at 248. The Board noted that mere "unpleasantries" uttered in the course of
organizational speech are generally not enough to remove section 7 protections-including characteri-
zations of management as "a-hole[s]," U.S. Postal Service, 241 N.L.R.B. 389, 390 (1979), or as "hypo-
critical," "despotic," and "tyrannical," Harris Corp., 269 N.L.R.B. 733, 736 (1984), or even references
to a company's CEO as a "cheap son of a bitch" in inter-employee conversations, Alaska Cummins
Services, Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 1194, 1194 (1986).
161. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 29 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 153.




they should then be placed within one of the three identified categories-
public, employer sponsored, or employee sponsored-before the disloyalty
exception doctrine is applied. As mentioned above, this initial categoriza-
tion takes account of two critical disloyalty exception factors: the blog's
intended audience and the related issue of the employee's motive for the
blog's speech content. The public forum presumes an intended audience of
employer customers and the general public, and allows an inference that
the employee intended to publicize some legitimate labor dispute to aid in
the resolution of that dispute.166 The employee-sponsored forum presumes
an intended audience of other employees and not the general public or cus-
tomers, and allows an inference that the employee intends to begin a dia-
logue between fellow employees to aid in the resolution of a labor
dispute. 167 The employer-sponsored forum depends entirely on the access
the public has to that forum: if there is no public access, the forum pre-
sumes an intended audience only of other employees and management, and
allows an inference that the employee desired both to dialogue with other
employees and to bring management attention to issues in the hopes of
resolving labor disputes. 1
68
This classification of the organizational speech's forum limits the
Board's and courts' reliance on subjective factors-what Branscomb calls
"the more nebulous, non-statutory issues of disloyalty and disparage-
ment"169-when applying the disloyalty exception: the speech's general
tone, direct relation to labor dispute at issue, and impact that the timing of
speech has with regards to the employer's marketplace standing (e.g., be-
fore a merger or an important product launch). In short, the threshold de-
termination of the organizational speech's forum should in effect dictate
the degree to which the more nebulous Jefferson Standard "disloyalty ex-
ception" factors are applied to subject that speech to discipline.
[lI]t is important to complete the concertedness (step one) and purpose (step two) inquiries be-
fore starting the disparagement/disloyalty inquiry.... [B]y adhering to the proper analysis,
subsequent decision makers will shorten the inquiry in those cases in which employees' con-
duct lacks the required concert or purpose .... [D]ecision makers who dispose of cases at the
first two steps have the additional benefit of avoiding the more nebulous, non-statutory issues
of disloyalty and disparagement .... Finally, on a practical level, when the Board and courts
fail to follow a coherent analytical approach, their decisions create precedent that is perplex-
ing to subsequent Board members or judges attempting to apply cases such as Jefferson Stan-
dard. Lack of clear distinctions among the three analytical steps causes confusion in the
substantive law concerning each of the three issues.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
166. If the public-forum speech was merely intended to insult the employer or damage its business,
the speech should not have met the threshold requirement of "for mutual aid and protection."
167. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 155, 158, 159 and accompanying text.
169. Branscomb, supra note 96, at 313.
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In the case of a public-forum-category blog, the presumed audience
(employer customers and the general public) and employee motive (at least
some intent to publicize labor disputes to aid in the resolution of those dis-
putes) justify applying the remaining disloyalty exception factors at the
traditional or mid-point level-removing speech with divisive general tone,
critical of the employer's products, or especially damaging to the employer
given its timing. Organizational speech made in the public-forum blog
should also more closely relate, in its entirety, to an actual, ongoing labor
dispute-as was the requirement in Jefferson Standard itself.170 Since no
employee is hosting the blog, concerns regarding the "overall blog content"
apparent in employee-sponsored blogs are moot. Additionally, it seems
important to note that employee organizational speech directed at third
parties--even clients or customers-can easily be taken with a grain of salt
(and the possible bad impacts for the employer thereby lessened) if the
third party clearly knows of the context in which the disparaging or critical
comments appear, and in public fora, that context is presumably a neutral
one designed to facilitate debate of this kind. 171
In the case of employee-sponsored fora like that in the Konop case, the
presumed audience (other employees and not the general public or em-
ployer customers) and motive (inter-employee dialogue to aid in the resolu-
tion of a labor dispute) justify lowering the application of the remaining
disloyalty exception doctrine to its weakest point. Since neither the em-
ployer nor its customers can access blog content, only the most egregiously
divisive or insulting speech should result in employee discipline. 172 Fur-
thermore, speech in employee-sponsored fora may be more loosely con-
nected to actual workplace disputes: it should only need to meet minimum
threshold requirements of relatedness as those requirements are applied in
the "for mutual aid and protection" analysis, and courts should hesitate to
remove "fringe speech" discussing replacement of supervisors or political
views from protection. 173 Though, as commentator Scott notes, "the multi-
tude of posts and comments contained on blogs will present an analytical
170. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
171. Sierra Publ'g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 217 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Moreover, extending § 7
protection in this direction does not pose an unreasonable threat to employers; third parties who receive
appeals for support in a labor dispute will filter the information critically so long as they are aware it is
generated out of that context.").
172. Providing an example of the disloyalty exception doctrine at its weakest application, the
Konop court allowed very divisive speech to remain protected. See supra note 154. Indeed, the apparent
hesitation to apply the disloyalty exception doctrine to entirely employer-sponsored fora because no
outside party has access also supports weakened application in the employee-sponsored blog as well.
See supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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challenge" when considering how closely blog content must relate to labor
disputes, the Board and courts should probably be content to accept, as
Scott suggests, that if the "critical mass" of posts or the overall intent of the
blog is for organization, it is protected.174
Furthermore, the Konop holding suggests (and other commentators
have noted) that even employer attempts to monitor this category of blogs
might in themselves be unfair labor practices if they chill employee organ-
izational speech. 175 Though the NLRB and courts have also considered
whether an employee's speech has been so disloyal as to render further
employment with a company practically impossible due to acrimony be-
tween the parties, regardless of any impact on the employer's business,
traditional labor law has often forced such parties to work together
again.' 76 This factor, on its own, seems to be a weak justification for allow-
ing employers to discipline otherwise protected employee speech.
Whether the disloyalty exception applies at all to the employer-
sponsored website-an internal company website that facilitates employee
comments or blogging-should depend entirely on whether the public has
access to the blog, again because of presumed audience and motive issues.
As stated above, if the public has no access to the employer-sponsored
blog, courts should apply the doctrine at a very weak level, if at all. If the
public does have access, then the presumed audience (customers or those
interested in the particular company hosting the larger website) and em-
ployee motive (to dialogue with other employees and to bring management
attention to issues in the hopes of resolving labor disputes) justify the ap-
plication of the disloyalty exception at its strongest here. Unlike the neutral
public forum, when the website is controlled by and bears the imprimatur
of the employer, and even if disclaimers are posted a certain number of
visitors (who presumably are clients or interested parties) can be expected
to mistakenly conclude that the employer controls and thereby endorses the
content of the employee blog, and is tacitly "endorsing" the speech.177 Fur-
thermore, employees posting comments to an employer-sponsored blog
174. See Scott, supra note 7, 17.
175. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
176. See Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 250 (1997). The Board ordered Leinweber
reinstated after drawn-out litigation. Id. In addressing the employer's contention that it would be diffi-
cult to continue employment relations with the disgruntled former employee, the Board stated that while
Leinweber was "a rather unusual person" and "a bit of a wise guy," ultimately the employer's "feelings
must take second place to the dictates of the statute; the employer who was called a 'cheap son-of-a-
bitch' by an employee [in a previously discussed case] was probably not entirely pleased either." Id.
177. See Washington Adventist Hosp., 291 N.L.R.B. 95, 98-99 (1988). In Washington Adventist,
the employee sent a message that appeared on every employee's computer screen and prevented them
from continuing work on their terminals. The message did not identify its sender; it is therefore possible
that the other employees may have believed the message was sent by their employer.
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expect their supervisors and management to review comments, and should
be aware that because of concurrent public access, highly divisive speech
has greater potential impact and causes greater damage. It would seem that
employee organizational speech has the highest potential to damage the
employer's relations with or perception by its customers here. Furthermore,
this forum raises traditional concerns-mostly articulated in the discussion
of employee organizational speech inside the workplace-about the em-
ployer's property interest (here, in its internet server) and its heightened
ability to control access to its use.
178
Should it be applied by the Board and courts, this new analytical
framework could also be very useful in guiding employee and employer
choices for organizational communication in the blogging format. To re-
ceive the most protection, employees would be wise to set up their blogs as
Konop did, limiting public access, openly encouraging employee dialogue,
overtly stating organizational goals, and editing comments to ensure that
the overall "critical mass" of content is organizational in nature. Indeed,
this set up would likely be most advantageous to employers, as well: it
limits damaging exposure of customers to divisive employee speech. Em-
ployers likewise might choose to limit public access to their provided blog
space if they want to spark more honest dialogue between management and
employees; employees would be more willing to speak freely about labor
disputes without fear that a broad application of the disloyalty exception
doctrine would allow them to be fired, and employers would thereby get a
more realistic picture of employee complaints. Employers might, on the
other hand, choose to allow their customers access to this forum, in which
case employee organizers would presumably know to be more cautious in
their organizational messages.
CONCLUSION
As the NLRA's impact on the lives of employees shrinks alongside
dwindling union membership, 179 the rise of employee organizational efforts
through new electronic media like blogs presents a renewed opportunity for
the aged statute to serve its goals of protecting worker organizational
rights. Employee organizational blogs can be, and in many cases already
are, an important tool for concerted action that can easily be considered
"for mutual aid and protection" under the broad definition the Board and
178. See supra notes 50, 62 and accompanying text.
179. Mark Weisbrot, Globalization for Whom?, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631, 638 (1998) ("Since
1973, union membership has fallen from twenty-four percent to about fourteen percent of the labor
force.").
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courts have traditionally lent those terms. The analogy between traditional
labor law policies governing employer bulletin boards, workplace solicita-
tion speech, and email use has already been drawn. Extending the "no dis-
criminatory use" doctrine, which arose in that traditional labor law context,
to internet use makes imminent sense, especially when considering the
incredible impact blogging can have on effective employee organization.
More importantly, though, the blog's public nature makes it susceptible to
the nebulous and inconsistent "disloyalty exception" standard, which the
Board and courts have misinterpreted and unevenly applied to remove oth-
erwise protected organizational speech from NLRA protections. To ensure
employee access to this critical forum and to shape employee and employer
choices regarding the use of organizational blogging in more positive ways,
the Board and courts should temper the application of subjective "disloy-
alty factors" according to what forum the speech occurs in, applying it most
strongly in the employer-controlled forum, at its midpoint in the public
forum, and most weakly in the employee controlled forum.

